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Issue No. 18 2010 — The Face and Technology
This Face: a Critique of Faciality as Mediated Self-Presence
By Warwick Mules 
In this paper I develop a concept of the face that begins with a simple idea: the face is that which withdraws
from self-presence, thereby enabling the possibility of self-relation with others. The face is the mark of the self
in the sense proposed by Walter Benjamin, as the medium that manifests the sign by withdrawing from it
(“Painting”), thereby opening up possibilities in the materiality of the medium itself for future self-
configurations unseeable in current forms of self-identity. This idea, I argue, leads to an affirmation of the self as
other, as the self “to come,” opening up possibilities for critique from the place where the face withdraws. My
aim here is to counter two tendencies in theoretical work: one in which the face is taken to be the sign of simple
self-presence, and the other where, in its withdrawal from self-presence, the face disappears into a system or
conceptual scheme, losing its singular specificity as this face, and hence its potential for being something other
than what it is.
To make my case I offer an analysis of the conventional face-to-face situation of direct communication with
another (the I-you relation), showing how it necessarily depends on a mediation that retreats as it makes this
relation possible. I argue that this retreating mediation is the face in its withdrawal and hence resistance to self-
identity and conceptual determination. Furthermore, I will demonstrate that the withdrawing face cannot be
elided or sublated into an idea or material affect without losing sight of the fact that it happens. My argument
counters the material-idealist concept of faciality proposed by Deleuze and Guattari as a “redundancy” within a
field of pure material affectivity (A Thousand Plateaus 168). Instead, I argue for a situated critique (critical praxis)
of the face opened to otherness in the finite place where it happens – ; as the mark of withdrawal from self-
presence. To demonstrate this, I will discuss photographic work as a creative political art practice that makes a
face appear as such, thereby enabling new self-relations motivated by renewed democratic concerns for global
“matters of concern.”
I
The face is one of the most studied, drawn and reproduced features of the human body, offered as a portrait of
the human soul and as a visible access to the innerness of the psyche. By looking at a human face we seem to
come in contact with something intimate, undeniably true or real. The face presents itself as unmediated
presence, a possibility of pure, direct experience of otherness, unaffected by words or symbols, a chance to step
outside our own subjective world into the world of others to share experience in the immediacy of a sensus
communis that transcends the subjective self. 
It’s no wonder then, that the term “face-to-face” has become a signifier of pure communication – either an
ideal to which all communication should aspire, or more critically, a false promise that obscures the entangled
context of mediation as the real condition of any communicative event. The term interface – the technological
platform that facilitates communication – retains a sense of this possibility of pure communication in the
presence of face-to-face interaction; the interface promises a seemingly transcendent space of common
experience, where users can commune unhindered by the mundane bodily experiences of quotidian subjective
life.
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Much has been written about the interface as a facilitating platform for communication and media events, but
what of the faciality of the interface itself? In what sense is an interface specifically a face? This question cannot
be answered by appealing to the instrumental capacities of the interface itself, since to do so would be to
presuppose the face as an already accomplished task in the tekhnè (the plan or calculation) that the interface
enacts. Rather we need to think of what it is that a face makes possible, what it enacts.  We must think of the
face as a singular phenomenon: this face that I see before me as I think the “you” that it makes apparent. But
what is this face before me – before the “me,” the “I” and the “you” that it makes apparent – that it makes
possible? 
For something to be seen there must be both a seer and a thing seen. Seeing always involves a self-reflection (a
praxis) that grounds seeing in an act of seeing. [1] This means that I must also see myself seeing you when I see
you. If I simply saw you there would be no reflection and hence no experience of an “I” to separate seeing from
the thing seen. I would in fact be you. This is confirmed when we consider the limit case where I see myself
reflected in the mirror: I always see myself as I see the “you” that I take myself to be. One cannot experience
alterity as complete otherness, since to do so would be to wipe out the experiencing self – the “I” that relates to
the other – thereby making the concept of alterity redundant. [2] To think the other as if it existed
independently of the self is to elide the place of the self in the self-relation required for an experience of alterity.
[3]
What this means is that my sense of “I” depends on a self-relation that can only occur by you and me not seeing
each other directly; by a mediation that always comes between us. But this “coming-between” does not block
self-relation, rather it makes it possible by a withdrawal that makes the self-relation happen. Self-presence is
possible but only by a mediation that withdraws in the act of making it possible. In terms of the face-to-face
situation, this mediation is the face – that which, by its appearing as such, makes the “seeing” of face-to-face
communication possible but is itself unseeable – invisible in the seeing itself. [4] Furthermore, this invisibility of
the face is not something that transcends the event of self-presence; it is not a “necessary condition” of the
immediacy of face-to-face presence. Rather, the invisible face is an immanence that marks the event by
withdrawing from it. [5] Its invisibility is thus not unseen, but a particular kind of visibility seen as a vanishing
from the scene of self-presence. 
This invisibility of the face – its withdrawal from sight in the very event of seeing – means that unmediated
experience is not impossible; rather its possibility comes through a mediation that the experience must disavow
at the same time. If the criterion for full, unmediated presence is direct seeing in face-to-face situations, then the
face marks the site not of fulfilled presence, but, quite the opposite, of an emptying of presence – an ecstasis that
opens the seeing self to an outside within the closure of the I-you relation itself. The face evacuates presence; it
withdraws from the I-you relation into the “outside” of seeing itself, into an indeterminate otherness. The face,
then, is not the interfacial platform on which an I-you relation is built but its absolute limit, the point at which
the I-you relation dissolves into faciality. 
By faciality I refer to a certain technicity of the face: its presence as a technical infrastructure grounded in specific
face encounters through time and space. I have borrowed the term infrastructure from Rodolph Gasché as an
“open matrix” (147) of “structurally nontotalizable arrangements of heterogeneous elements” (100). A technical
infrastructure grounds the face in temporal and spatial visibility; it makes the face live on through technological
mediation understood broadly as the very possibility of communicative interaction between individuals gathered
into formations of self-identity. As technical infrastructure, faciality is the face’s materiality – its material support
distributed through the technological transformation of face encounters over time and space. These encounters
– the myriad events which constitute our own everyday lives – involve both power and freedom as the self’s
chance to renew itself in its relation to others; as the perpetual grounding of the otherwise ungrounded body in
technical mediation. The face dissolves into faciality when it reaches the limit of what it represents – when it no
longer identifies a subject but passes into otherness. In passing into otherness the face withdraws – folds back
into its technical support, thereby retaining a capacity to move forward at the same time, but at the expense of
self-identity. Faciality as such can only be experienced, therefore, as a technical obsolescence (a withdrawing or
fading) that grounds the face in the ruins of self-identity. 
The face does not mean my face or someone else’s face. Face is not an appearance (for a self) that conceals
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something behind it. The face is not a mask,  even in the sense of a mask that hides nothing. Rather the face is
the fact of otherness and in this fact a self is (myself as face, in the possibility that I am for others). The face of the
other is not another face, but face as other, thought strictly in its as-ness, without mediation. Being without
mediation does not mean in the absence of mediation, nor does it mean pure unmediated presence; rather, it
means being in or on the outside of mediation – being with-out what mediates.
As the fact of otherness, the face grounds the self in self-presence, constituting a basis for self-identity predicated
on the I-you relation. However, in doing this, the face necessarily withdraws, so that the grounding of the self is
also an ungrounding. The self is both grounded and ungrounded at the same time, a chiasmic movement that
dissolves self-identity and opens to absolute possibilities. This openness is not an opening into groundlessness,
but an affirmation of the finite self as otherwise, in resistance to what it already is. [6] If I am a face before I can
be an “I” then this face that I am, this face-as-self, is always something that faces another by withdrawing from it.
The self persists as a being-self, but only by resisting what it already is as an “I” in relation to a “you.” In its
faciality, the self withdraws from any identity assigned to it, and in this withdrawal marks itself as a face, as a
singular, indeterminate event.
My attempt here to think the singularity of the face has uncovered a space of potential selfhood in relation to an
other that always remains outside the I-you conditions of self-presence (the basis of speech as logos or
discourse). This space constitutes the possibility of a beginning, or a beginning of the possibilities of forming
new self-other relations that does not depend on already operating I-you relations defined by calculated
selfhoods and determined by types and markers of identity. This space – the space occupied by the withdrawing
face in its “invisible visibility” – is the limit of the self in its relation to an other, and hence the chance of the self
as other.
II
The experience of unmediated presence defined by an encounter with the face is a major philosopheme in
Western thought since Hegel, setting problems for self-overcoming in the split between the self and other that
the encounter enacts. I have suggested that arguments about technological mediation in which the face is
understood as a construction of technological processes (tekhnè) are insufficient because they presuppose a self-
other relation that constitutes the mediation itself – a relation that still has to be accounted for. We still need to
understand mediation itself as a face – a face that withdraws, and in this withdrawal a self exists. In the face’s
withdrawal, the self becomes grounded in what it already is, but only insofar as this is-ness is grasped resistively
as a residual element of the withdrawing face. 
In what follows in this section I propose a brief critique of Deleuze and Guattari’s influential concept of
faciality. My aim here is to show how Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the face, while offering clarifying
analysis of faciality as absolutely other, nevertheless lacks critical purchase on the encounter itself – the event of
the face. Deleuze and Guattari’s work is a pre-critical attempt to open up the transcendental field of faciality as
groundless otherness. Their work is thus limited to a safe analytical description of this field (safe because what it
sees is seen well in advance, in the pure gaze looking out from the perspective of absolute otherness). Instead I
propose a critical praxis of specific engagements with face encounters as grounded critique (discussed more fully
in Section IV). Grounded critique opens itself to absolute possibilities by risking its own ground in self-
reflection.
In their book What is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari develop a philosophical analysis of the concept by
drawing on specific philosophical gestures (Descartes, Kant) as exemplary for modern thought. Their aim is to
create concepts out of the gestures by submitting them to their immanent conditions of possibility; to the field
of conceptuality through which they operate. In one such exercise, they develop a concept of the other,
providing the following scene:
Let us proceed in a summary fashion: we will consider a field of experience taken as a real world
no longer in relation to a self but to a simple “there is.” There is, at some moment, a calm and
restful world. Suddenly a frightened face looms up that looks at something out of the field. The
other person appears here as neither subject nor object but as something that is very different: a
possible world, the possibility of a frightened world. … Here then, is a concept of the other that
8/25/2015 TRANSFORMATIONS
http://www.transformationsjournal.org/journal/issue_18/article_01.shtml 4/11
presupposes no more than the determination of a sensory world as condition. On this condition
the other appears as the expression of a possibility. (What is Philosophy? 17)
Here Deleuze and Guattari locate an initial philosophical gesture in the phenomenon of a problematic self-other
encounter, adding to the long line of such gestures  from Descartes to Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger,
Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, and Derrida. In Deleuze and Guattari’s scene, the encounter is described in terms of a
“field of experience,” which is in effect a pure field of experience; that is, one emptied of any conceptual
determination by the elimination of the subjective self. Deleuze and Guattari ask what does an encounter with
this pure field of experience bring forth; what does it make possible? Their answer is an other in the irruption of
a frightened face. Deleuze and Guattari’s empirical gesture (the privileging of the sensible as the primary site of
knowledge) means that the other does not exist outside or behind the experience, but emerges from the
experience itself. The other is an experience of otherness, experienced as “the expression of a possibility.” 
Deleuze and Guattari do not want to relate this experience to a self; they do not want to invoke otherness in
relation to self-experience, self-consciousness or self-awareness: “we will consider a field of experience taken as
a real world no longer in relation to a self but to a simple ‘there is.’” This field of experience, as a “simple ‘there
is’” comes prior to any self in its relation to the other, so that what we’re left with is a field of pure otherness.
We can clarify this issue more fully by referring to Deleuze’s discussion of the transcendent Idea in Difference and
Repetition. At one point he posits the possibility of the “transcendent exploration of the Idea” (204) as pure
difference; that is, as a transcendent field in which the opposition between self and other is pluralised into pure
difference. This “pluralisation” of opposition replaces the negativity of the “not” (not-being, not-I, not-self and
so forth) with a positivity of singularities. In effect, this procedure opens up the possibility of a pure
transcendent field of otherness that dispenses with the self as self-consciousness; that is, a field of pluralised
differences suspended in the Idea yet grounded in singular positivity at the same time. [7]
However, as I will shortly demonstrate, this field is not simply a field of otherness in the complete absence of
any self, but a field that transcends the self as the absolute condition of selfhood. Furthermore, this field is not
provisional, virtual or possible, but a “real world,” or “there is,” a world directly accessible to experience.
Deleuze and Guattari thus lay claim to a special insight – a pre-critical analytical gaze disencumbered by self-
reflection, and close to Spinoza’s God-like vision of the absolutely real. Their concept of the face and faciality
needs to be understood in terms of the possibilities of the self opened up in transcendental analysis which gains
direct access to faciality as a real world event, thus reversing the usual procedure of transcendental analysis which,
since Kant, surrenders the God-like gaze of absolute knowing in order to begin with a critical moment of real
world indeterminacy – in the openness of a possibility that cannot be known in advance.
A transcendental analysis cannot presuppose the self as an already constituted entity (an ipseity), but must
describe its conditions of emergence, its very possibility. And in this regard, Deleuze and Guattari’s scene of the
irrupting face is exemplary. However, in presenting this “calm and restful world” of experience rudely
interrupted by the looming face, Deleuze and Guattari are asking too much: by excluding the self they are
obliged to let it back in again. This re-inscription comes in the form of an appearance: “The other person
appears here.” The face is not simply a face, a simple “there is,” as they propose, but something that makes
another person appear. [8] Now, an appearance cannot be an appearance for itself, but must be an appearance
for someone, a self who sees it as a face of an other. Deleuze and Guattari describe this possibility in the
following way: “the other person appears here [in this face] as neither subject nor object but as something that is
very different.” In “appearing here,” the “other person” must be an appearance for someone, another self in its
relation to this “other person,” but a self that is “very different” from a subjective or objective self. This self
that appears, neither subject nor object, is another being in relation to the being that the face is. The self for
which the face appears is part of the being-in-relation of beings in general or, as Alain Badiou has written, the
“being multiple” (Theoretical Writings 170) of singular being related in a field of appearances. [9] But since
Deleuze and Guattari have specifically excluded the self from the field that they are describing, what status does
this self have if it cannot be a self? The self here must be a self held in suspension, in the possibility that the face
announces, as “the expression of a possible.” 
But we still need to account for a stubborn fact: the fact that the other person “appears here,” and hence in no
other place. This appearing here; this deixis of the face as an appearance for a suspended self, means that the
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self must already be present to the other, must already be in some sense the possibility that the other announces.
What this scene presents is not simply the “concept of the other that presupposes no more than the
determination of a sensory world as condition,” but this face that “appears here” to a self, in an already
grounded encounter, recounted in words in this book, in my reading of it, as an example of the very possibility
of the “concept of the other.” The concept carries with it its necessary grounding in an “expression of the
possible” which is that very possibility. 
In their example, Deleuze and Guattari describe an experience of the face as if it had already withdrawn from
the self, in the pure experience of otherness. However, what we have seen is not a completely withdrawn face,
but a face in the act of withdrawing from the self, in the “frightening” prospect of otherness, prepared for
flight. [10] Deleuze and Guattari’s frightened face can be seen as the fleeing face of Dasein but looked at from the
perspective of the other. The face’s withdrawal into “the possibility of a frightened world” must also be, then, the
self’s own fact: its finite possibility as a singular self, here, at this place, confronted by the looming face. The self
is, but only insofar as this is-ness is made possible by the presence of a looming, frightened face looking
otherwise. What it makes possible then is not something that might come in some future time, but something
that has already arrived: a finite self exposed in the singularity of the “there is.” 
In withdrawing from the self, in allowing the self to be, the face does not collapse into an abyss of nothing, but
disappears into the oblivion (forgetfulness) of faciality: the barely visible technicity (arche- text) that makes a self
possible in its “vanishing” or retreat from the scene. This arche-text – text as (ungrounded) ground of self-
presence – is the “open matrix” of technicity (the resistive play of signifiers) that both supports and undermines
the system of philosophy (transcendental analysis) that we encounter in Deleuze and Guattari’s book. A critical
praxis engages with the face in its withdrawal from the self, here in this instance, but against the grain of Deleuze
and Guattari’s analysis and the system that it outlines, as the finite possibility of a new self yet to be related to an
other.  
III
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of faciality can be understood in terms of what Deleuze calls “reverse
Platonism,” or the reversal of the order of the Idea and its actualisation. In Platonism, the Idea transcends the
actual whereas in reverse Platonism the Idea is an immanent event within the actual itself: “Events are ideational
singularities which communicate in one and the same Event” (Logic of Sense 53). In an event, “each ‘thing’ opens
itself up to the infinity of predicates through which it passes, as it loses its centre, that is, its identity as concept
or self”  (174). A Thousand Plateaus offers a description of faciality in terms of what the authors call an “abstract
machine,” as an immanent event inhabiting actual “concrete” faces. The concrete face is “engendered by an
abstract machine of faciality” (168) or set of globalised energy-information relations that specifies particular
kinds of subjectivities in localised sites of subjectification: “the abstract machine of faciality assumes a role of
selective response, or choice: given a concrete face, the machine judges whether it passes or not, whether it goes
or not, on the basis of the elementary facial traits” (177). And “it is faces that choose their subjects” (180). The
purpose of an abstract machine is “the computation of normalities” (178). The abstract machine is a system in
the Hegelian sense as the Idea becoming itself in material actuality. [11] 
The abstract machine of faciality is not a universal system (an Idea) that determines the subjectification of the
self-as-face, but a univocal systematisation (an immanent ideation) that disseminates faciality across a field of
experience. [12] Becoming-self then, is not a movement from an indeterminate sense to a determined self-
identity (the self does not evolve or come to be from some embryonic state). Rather, becoming-self is precisely
the reverse: a movement from the determination of self-identity secured in current modes of facialisation, to the
self as indeterminate singularity: the “black hole of subjectivity” (A Thousand Plateaus 168). The self is a subtraction
from the determinations of the abstract machine of facialisation: a resistive singularity of pure sense, where “all
referents are lost, and the formation of man gives way to a new, unknown element, to the mystery of a formless,
nonhuman life” (Essays Critical and Clinical 77). 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of faciality floats in the Idea; in the groundlessness of pure otherness that calls
for a grounding in the concretion of the actual. Now, in proposing faciality in this way, Deleuze and Guattari
reject both the Hegelian “negation of the negation” in which the self becomes what it is by a negation of the
not-self as other, and the Kantian moment of self-reflection in which the self becomes what it is through a
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spontaneous self-beginning. That is, Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the self is pre-critical in that it does not
refer to a critical moment where the self becomes grounded in self-reflection. Rather, the self “becomes” from
the groundless Real of an immanent ideation, rendering it incoherently singular (“a new, unknown element ...
the mystery of a formless, nonhuman life”). Deleuze and Guattari replace Kantian and Hegelian critique and its
problem of ground (what are the grounds of the self – under what conditions can a self be?) with a reverse
Platonism, drawing from Spinoza, Leibniz and Bergson, concerned with the becoming ground of the self,
subtracted from the groundlessness of a “purely formal Real” (Gabriel and Žižek 12). [13]
I have indicated that through Deleuze and Guattari’s own example, as well as the example offered at the
beginning of this paper, the face cannot be thought except through an experience of a face, at the moment
when a face appears as other. My point here is that this experience is always grounded in its fact – in the
unavoidable event of its occurrence, and is thus thoroughly implicated in a critical moment of indeterminacy.
Instead of a pre-critical analytical gaze that begins from the ideational experience of the face (the face as abstract
machine) I begin from the experience of the face itself, embedded in particular events of faciality, responding
critically to the indeterminacy it manifests and other ways of being towards which it points. This critical
engagement with the event of the face begins strictly from the contingency of the event itself, in the “there is”
of the field of experience that Deleuze and Guattari invoke. But this “there is” of this field, this fact of
experience, is not “simple,” as Deleuze and Guattari would have it. It is not a pure field of experience devoid of
the reflective complexities of the self. Rather, as I have indicated in my reading of their text, it is necessarily
inhabited by the possibilities of a self at the very moment of its exemplification; a self must be – must be in
relation to the other that this field invokes, even if Deleuze and Guattari have explicitly ruled this out.
IV
The challenge is to engage in a critical praxis that begins from the place of self reflection, at the point where the
self becomes indeterminately other, and from that place begin to think the possibility of a new self-relation in
the indeterminacy of sense. To indicate how this might occur I refer to a series of photographs taken by the
theorist-photographer Alan Sekula, published under the title Waiting for Tear Gas, and Philip Armstrong’s
analysis of them in his recent book Reticulations: Jean-Luc Nancy and the Networks of the Political. The photographs
document violent clashes between police and demonstrators that took place in Seattle during the 1999 World
Traded Organisation summit meeting, while Armstrong reads the photographs in terms of a new kind of global
politics – a politics of global visibility operating in “the space of the real” (216), making a new face of resistance
visible in the global mediascapes of public life. Outlining the various failures of leftist political action in resisting
global capitalism, Armstrong invites us to see Sekula’s photographs as an affirmation of the possibilities of
resistance, mobilised by the photographs themselves.
By presenting themselves in the absence of meta-coding or explanatory framework, Sekula’s photographs
invoke the raw “there is” of the Seattle clashes: the “res gestae” (217) of the event as an expressive fact marked
on the photographic image itself – similar to Barthes’s concept of the punctum (Camera Lucida 27). The
photographs “attest to … the untechnical matter-of-factness of their visual description, their banal, almost
dumb facticity” (226). They constitute a
“simple descriptive physiognomy” of the protests, one in which the “alliance” on the streets and
the “new face” of protest are given visibility in ways that do not merely lend themselves to a
narrative unfolding … There is no politics of representation either, in the sense that there is no
attempt to represent the protestors and derive or deduce a politics from that representation.
There is only an exposure, in which the demonstrators are presented in terms of their appearance
and visibility – their “new face” or in which the relation within and between the demonstrators,
police and WTO representatives comes into view. (217-218, emphasis added).
The images do not represent the Seattle event (they do not invite the viewer to see past them to some abstract
idea of what the event means); rather they expose the event in a certain way, making a physiognomy – a face –
come into view. This face appears in terms of a relation between forces whose rivalry erupts in a clash at this
particular place and time. This face appears here at this moment, as the images themselves show us. 
This face is not a metonym for a more general “face of resistance.” Rather it marks the place of resistance as
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“waiting” in anticipation of what is to come, not only for the tear gas signalled in the title Waiting for Tear Gas,
but in anticipation of future events of resistance, future political acts and future gatherings of people in other
contexts within the global mediascapes into which the images will eventually be disseminated: “they gesture
toward the appearance of a people, in the sense that they expose a new face or in the sense that this space of
appearance is simultaneously transformed into the space of exposure” (Armstrong 231). In their “lack of
recognition and legibility in the ‘new face of protest’” (221), the photographs become “an enabling measure for
rethinking a larger set of critical initiatives, in which the very constitution of contemporary political movements
is debated and proposed, including the creation of new terms for defining this ‘new face’ of protest itself” (220).
By exposing the Seattle demonstrations as such, they cut through the dialectical power between the opposing
forces of capital and anti-capital, offering  instead a new possibility, a “new face” of resistance in the res gestae of
the event itself for a “people to come.” 
Here we can see the outlines of a certain democratic process characterised by dissensus: a creative practice of
exposing a “gap in the sensible itself” (Rancière 38). By resisting aesthetic expectations of formal unity and
symbolic recuperation into higher order meaning, the images fracture and fragment the event, opening it up to
potentially new meanings and modes of engagement that would otherwise be denied in a strict dialectical
struggle between capital and anti-capital forces. They become an “enabling measure” to debate what is to be
done in a freely articulated way, “creating new terms” for political action. The images democratise the possibility
of political action and resistance to global power by refusing totalisation themselves, by stubbornly remaining
indeterminate and open to future reading, thought and action. 
By democratisation I mean the process of retaining a certain freedom to think the being-together of individuals
as part of a free polis; a process that requires the capacity to reflect on and risk current modes of self-hood and
self-identity for an opened relation to otherness (see my “Democracy and Critique: Recovering Freedom in
Nancy and Derrida”). Here we can draw on Chantal Mouffe’s call for a radical democracy based on the civic
republican idea of “public goods” shared by individuals in a free polis (Mouffe 227-228). In civic republicanism,
individuals are not related to one another by virtue of mutually recognised liberties (negative freedom) but by a
constituting being-together oriented to commonly shared public goods (positive freedom). The photographs in
Waiting for Tear Gas contribute to the formation of new political affiliations gathered around common global
interests (e.g. environmental issues of deforestation and water conservation, third world poverty, religious and
ethnic injustices, animal rights and so forth) now emerging as part of a global polis of politically motivated
individuals and groups debating and formulating projects and responses to “public goods” shared by humanity-
at-large. This new space is a space of positive freedom: freedom burdened with the collective responsibility to
be; to affirm one’s being-with others as positive for being a self. It appears in-between the social identities and
political affiliations of subjects already captured within the confines of liberal democracy and its compromise
with global capital, enabling new identities and modes of selfhood to be brought into existence through
renewed and redirected political debate and action. This being-brought-into-existence involves an orientation to
public goods that become the “matters of concern” (Latour 231) around which new modes of selfhood can be
formed. 
This “new face” of protest becomes real in its appearing as such, in the “space of the real” opened up to the
future. In returning to the issues discussed in the first part of this paper,  the photographs in Waiting for Tear Gas
make the face of resistance appear as part of an infrastructure (an “open matrix”) of material affects and
significations, but in such a way that it folds back into its technical support: into the “dumb facticity” of
photographic materiality. In this case, identity fades into technical asignification or what Barthes calls signifiance
(“The Third Meaning” 65), in a creative act of technical obsolescence (by refusing current aesthetic modes, the
photographs retreat into their primitive photographic form). The photographs are thus a withdrawal from the
event: they partake of the event by withdrawing from it, by showing us this withdrawing back into the
nothingness of waiting within the photographic medium itself. They make the face of the other appear as such, in
the res gestae of the event and in the photographs themselves. The photographs thus carry with them part of the
event as an affirmation of the face as other, in the open indeterminacy of new forms of selfhood defined by
potential political acts in resistance to dominant global order and power.
The photographs suggest a nexus between art and politics in terms of a critical praxis that makes a face appear.
As a creative act, art exposes self-identity as a system (the system of identities that regulate who and what we are
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as subjects). The artefacts it produces become both documentations of resistance and affirmations of otherness,
pointing to future ways of being-a-self occluded in current modes of self-identity. As a critical praxis, art is able
to make new relations appear as possibilities within sites of a renewed critical democracy. These relations are
grounded in positive freedom: a common orientation to public goods which become matters of concern over
which debate and action can take place, rather than the private pursuit of self-interest as is currently the case in
Western liberal democracies.
V
Faciality (the mediation of the self-other relation) is not nothing – it cannot be made to disappear in the self-
evidence of a pure experience of the other, but is itself the mark of this disappearing – its fact as a face, as
technical faciality that always remains as material ground, as part of infrastructure. Faciality is not an abstract
machine or ideational form whose immanence to the self constitutes the self’s condition of subjectification, but
the immanence in all modes of subjectification that releases a self for otherness. This immanence is defined by
the finitude of the self, its relation to otherness engaged strictly in singular circumstances, as a critical reflection
or praxis on what might possibly be. This praxis does not position itself transcendentally on the side of pure
otherness, but within the complexity of the self-other relation as it is experienced, in the “immediate”
appearance of the other (to a finite self). This appearance marks the flight of the other away from the self into
faciality, or the technical infrastructure that supports it by retreating from the scene. The face is the ruination of
the self as self-identity, and in this ruination the possibility of a future self emerges. Creative acts of self-
indeterminacy, such as those we saw in Sekula’s photographs, draw attention to this possibility as well as making
it happen through dissemination into public mediascapes. 
A critique of the face as the withdrawal of self-presence needs to be located in specific instances of faciality,
where the appearance of the face disturbs the self-evidence of identity. As I have argued, the face is not the site
of self-identity: it does not signify a self in relation to an other in terms of an I-you. Rather, the face is the
ground on which self-identity operates but which, in this very operation, withdraws into the invisibility of
technical background that remains all but unrecognisable. The face “carries” the possibilities of a self back into
itself, which is not an inward self-reflection, but a resistive affirmation – a becoming what the self already is – in
its openness to what it can be, thought strictly from the finitude of where it is. This being-carried-back-into-
what-it-already-is is the face drawing back into the mediation that makes it possible, into the “faciality” of
technical infrastructure as open ground that ungrounds the self, making it possible to imagine a new self other
than what it currently is.
 
Warwick Mules teaches in communication and cultural studies in the School of English, Media Studies
and Art History at the University of Queensland. Recent publication includes “Democracy and Critique:
Recovering Freedom in Nancy and Derrida.” Derrida Today. May 2010.
Endnotes
1. Praxis is a “doing” that is the very thing that it does: “Seeing, for example, is properly a praxis. In this
praxis there is no opposition between seeing and having seen. Likewise, understanding is properly a
praxis. But there is no opposition between understanding and having understood. At the same time we
understand and have understood” (Taminiaux 147). Praxis is not method. A method separates how it
does things from the thing that it does. Methods have rules, calculations and procedures that can be
applied universally in all instances. Praxis however is singular doing that reflects on what it does in the
possibilities of how and what it should be. Method tries to eliminate risk by determining outcomes in
advance, whereas praxis risks what it is in self-reflection. 
2. Levinas’s attempt to think of the face as an idealised incarnation of otherness requires a sacrifice of the
self to the other – a quasi-religious experience of transcendence-immanence with the other-as-God-in-
me (“Beyond Intentionality” 112-113). Levinas’s approach implies a non-critical attitude to the other,
and hence leaves no room for the free reflective thought necessary for grounded critical praxis. 
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3. This point is made by Hegel in his phenomenology: the self as self-consciousness must  recognise itself
in the other: “… in the other [it] sees its own self”  (Hegel, Phenomenology 111). 
4. The problem of self-presence as a praxis of self-undoing – its paradoxical withdrawal in being presented
as such – is  traceable to a number of sources including Lacan’s theory of the pure self-constituting gaze
undone by the desire for the unattainable objet petit a;Merleau-Ponty’s revision of Husserl’s theory of
phenomenal intention (Phenomenology) and his posthumously published notes on self-touching (The Visible
and the Invisible); Derrida’s deconstruction of Husserlian intentionality (Speech and Phenomena); and more
recently Nancy’s post-Hegelian/Heideggerian theory of ecstatic sense (The Sense of the World, Being Singular
Plural) (see also Derrida, On Touching). 
5. Benjamin proposes the mark as the ideal-material trace of the typographical sign: “The first basic
difference [between the mark and the sign] is that the sign is printed on something, whereas the mark
emerges from it” (“Painting” 84). The mark is a “surge of white waves” (“Painting” 83) or pure material
pulse that opens experience to an absolute temporality (the collapse of the difference between the future
and the past) by a simultaneous withdrawal from signification. 
6. See Heidegger’s discussion of ground in Pathmarks (134). Heidegger shows how ground can be
understood ontologically as “abyssal,” that is, as the ground of freedom. But this abyss of ground is not
groundlessness; there can be no groundless being. Rather abyssal ground is ground opened out to
absolute possibility. Freedom here is finite freedom burdened with existential responsibility to be, in the
face of nothingness or absolute otherness. 
7. This move by Deleuze and Guattari follows German post-Kantian idealism responding to Kant,
especially the philosophy of Schelling, as a positive philosophy of the Absolute, employing a ‘genetic
constructivism’ based on ‘post-kantian generative ontology’ (Toscano 120) rather than the negative
dialectics of Hegel. This links with both Schelling’s and Deleuze and Guatari’s Spinozism (Toscano 118)
and their “life philosophy” as developed for instance in A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. 
8. Deleuze and Guattari’s field of subjectless appearances is drawn from Nietzsche’s theory of
perspectivism. See The Will to Power, #636 (339). 
9. Alain Badiou clarifies what is meant here: “Appearance does not depend on the presupposition of a
constituting subject. Being-multiple does not appear for a subject. Rather, it is of the essence of being to
appear once it is admitted that, since a being cannot be situated according to the whole, it must assert its
being-multiple with regard to the non-whole, that is, with regard to another particular being, which
determines the being of the ‘there’ in being-there. … The essence of appearance is relation” (Theoretical
Writings 170). 
10. Here I am tempted to make a connection to Heidegger’s Dasein in its struggle to be. Dasein (the self’s
originary possibility) is initially threatened with absorption into otherness (death); in order to escape this
fate, Dasein must singularise itself by fleeing in the face of the threatening other (Being and Time 298). 
11. Hegel’s system relates to the necessity of the Idea as an “original synthetic unity [which] must be
conceived … as a truly necessary, absolute, original identity of opposites” (qtd. in Gasché, Tain 28).
Deleuze revises the Hegelian Idea so that the Idea becomes immanent-difference as event, as a “singular
Idea of difference” (Difference and Repetition 26-27). 
12. In his writings on film, Deleuze describes the face image in terms of its dislocation from the sensory-
motor links of the perceiving body: “we find ourselves before an intensive face each time that the traits
break free from the outline, begin to work on their own account, and form an autonomous series which
tends toward a limit or crosses a threshold” (Cinema 1 89).  Film is a disjunctive apparatus which links the
perceiving body to image-material as “pure possibilities, pure virtualities” (105) in singular instances of 
“any-space-whatsoever” (109) spreading across a cinematic field. The film face can thus be located
genealogically through space and time as a singular-plural material ideation, consolidating into a collective
expressive identity: “directly uniting an immense collective reflection with the particular emotions of
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each individual [face]; in short expressing the unity of power and quality” (92). 
13. See also Badiou (Deleuze) who points out that Deleuze’s philosophy is classical, that is, pre-Kantian. He
argues that for Deleuze, ground is what unifies singularities in “the absolute Unity of Being,” or ground
as absolutely virtual (45). 
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